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Abstract
The paper identifies and analyses the main economic subjects which have impact on the emergence and breakdown of the cartels
in the country of small economy with developed culture of competition. The modified M. Porter's "Five Forces“ model is used as 
the methodological base for the empirical analysis in Lithuania. The analysed period is 2000 - 2014 years. The analysis proved 
that the business associations and intension of undertakings to form the cartels are the main factors in the analysed country, 
which had positive impact on the emergence of the cartel. The producers of substitutes and potential competitors had no effect. 
The biggest influence on the breakdown of the cartel had the activity of Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania. 
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Introduction
Despite the development of legislation on competition policy and its supervisory authorities’ activities, the 
prohibited agreements – cartels,- emerge in the modern economy. The European Union and national statistics only
confirm the annually growing number of detected cartels, justifying the relevance and timeliness of the problems 
addressed. Cartel problems have received a significant attention from researchers and practitioners (Marshall & 
Marx, 2012, Connor, 2011, 2010, 2008, Veljanovski 2011, Utton, 2011, Davies & Ormosi, 2010, Hüschelrath, 2009,
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Bolotova et al., 2007, Connor & Bolotova, 2006, Levenstein & Suslow, 2006, 2004). The spectrum of their studies is
broad, covering the economic and managerial aspects of cartel activities, the assessment of damage caused by 
cartels, the efficiency of competition policy implementation, targeted to fight against cartels. In Lithuania, having
little competition policy implementation practices, there is not much research done to analyse cartel problems.
Damage caused by cartels and the efficiency of competition policy with respect to cartels has been mainly dealt by 
Bruneckiene & Pekarskiene (2015), Bruneckiene et al. (2014), .OLPDãDXVNLHQơ6WDQLNǌQDV
Theoretical and practical studies have proved that the operation of cartels in the market is affected by many
factors, and prior to each cartel formation it is difficult to predict its success or failure in the future. In addition, in 
the countries of different competitive culture these factors can vary. Despite the growing interest of scientists in the 
success factors of cartel operation in the market, there is still a lack of research, particularly from the perspective of 
small economies with a developing culture of competition, on the factors and economic subjects that determine the 
emergence and breakdown of cartels. Identification of these factors would help the competition authorities to faster,
more accurately and with lower costs identify the markets where cartels are most likely to emerge, would contribute 
to the efficiency of these authorities’ activities and prevent the emergence of cartels in the market.
Purpose of the article: to identify the main economic subjects and analyse their impact on the emergence and 
breakdown of the cartels in Lithuania, as the country of small economy with developed culture of competition.
Methodology used in the article: systemic, comparative and logical scientific literature analysis; empirical 
research employing systemic analysis of external secondary data. This article deals with both hard core cartels and 
prohibited agreements in public procurement.
1. Methodological aspects of cartels emergence and breakdown in the market 
The mechanism of cartel operation in the market has been analyzed by scholars in different ways: some 
introduced the dynamic and static oligopoly models, others used the game theory, while others described in simple 
words. Marshall & Marx (2012) modified Porter’s Five Forces model in order to show the competition between a
cartel and non-cartel companies and the relationship with customers, suppliers, potential competitors and substitutes.
The authors of this article, having analyzed Porter’s (1990) original and Marshall & Marx’s (2012) modified Five
Forces model, believe that the inclusion of economic subjects, affecting cartel activities, into the Five Forces model
would specify and reveal in a more detailed way the peculiarities of cartel operation in the market and increase its
methodological application. Porter's Five Forces model, modified by the authors, is presented in Figure 1.
Fig. 1 Economic subjects determining the emergence and breakdown of a cartel 
(Created by the authors, based on Marshall, Marx 2012, Porter 1990)
The model distinguishes the main economic subjects that influence the emergence and breakdown of a cartel. Not all 
companies form a cartel, thus, the model distinguishes a cartel forming companies (which, under the agreement, do not 
compete with one another) and non-cartel companies, which compete with the cartel and other non-cartel companies.
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Cartel activity is affected not only by the intensity of competition between the cartel and non-cartel companies, but also by 
the potential competitors who want to enter to the market (thus increasing competition in the market), and the producers of 
substitutes, providing the consumers of cartel products with additional opportunities of choice. Cartel companies have 
often concluded a contract with suppliers, and the suppliers’ determination and possibility to negotiate and/or terminate 
the contract with cartel companies and choose to supply for other companies has an impact on the object of a prohibited 
agreement (e.g. the price or quantity) and its size, as well as the efficiency and stability of the cartel itself. The purchasers, 
having a possibility of an alternative choice of products, reduction or termination of the purchase, buying from a non-
cartel company or reporting about the cartel to competition authorities, influence the activity and stability of a cartel. As a 
separate group, the model distinguishes the subjects representing business interests (e.g. associations, unions, societies, 
etc.), which, by creating conditions for the competitors to meet and get information, or even setting certain requirements
for its members, can influence the emergence of a cartel or encourage them to participate in it. Another group 
distinguished in the model involves the subjects of public sector (e.g. ministries, municipalities, budgetary institutions at 
the government, public institutions associated with the public interest, etc.), which, under certain circumstances, can 
be both the buyers of cartel products (clients) and intermediary (usually via co-financing) between a cartel company 
and the end buyer. The conditions and requirements set by this group may also influence the emergence and 
operation of cartels in the market. The Government and competition authorities, through the implemented
competition policy and regulations, make an undeniable impact on the cartel and reduce opportunities for the 
occurrence and its successful operation in the market.
Based on the developed model, the analysis of situation on cartels in Lithuania, as a small economy with a
developing culture of competition, will be conducted.
2. Empirical analysis of economic subjects, influencing the emergence and breakdown of cartels in Lithuania
Although the International Monetary Fund (2015) assigns Lithuania to the group of advanced economies, the 
national culture of competition is still underdeveloped, where all market participants would treat competition as a value
and understand that the infringement of competition by entering into prohibited agreements is a crime which cannot be 
tolerated. On the one hand, the Lithuanian history of supervising competition, compared to other countries, is still very
young - less than 20 years, the Law on Competition is not well known in the business community, and often the 
entrepreneurs do not realize that they are infringing the regulations of competition law. On the other hand, not only an 
effective competition authorities' work, but the application of infringement of competition related preventive measures
and ability to use them would facilitate the detection of a cartel in the market and reduce its life time, thus reducing the 
damage caused to economy by the cartel.
In order to identify the economic subjects, affecting cartel activities in Lithuania, the analysis on cartels in 2000 -
2014 was conducted, based on the Lithuanian Competition Council’s published official annual reports and its 
resolutions on violations of the Law on Competition. In the analyzed period, 34 cartels were detected; the average 
number of cartel participants - 7, the average duration of a cartel - 3 years. For an analysis, the authors classified cartels
into 3 groups: 1) prohibited agreements in the public procurement (see Fig. 2); 2) cartels in the ‘Business-to Business
(B to B)’ market (see Fig. 3); 3) cartels in the ‘Business-to-Consumer (B to C)’ market (see Fig. 4).
In the period of 2000 - 2014, 12 prohibited agreements in the public procurement sphere were detected in Lithuania.
In the majority of cases such agreements involved 2 or 3 participants; the agreements associated with complaints 
(mostly against the organizers of public procurement and public procurement supervising authorities) are detected
quickly, this is why their existence lasts only a few months. Of the 12 cartels, 10 agreements (83.3 %) were initiated by 
the companies tendering in a public procurement, who submitted for the procurement pre-agreed tender proposals, thus 
eliminating competition between them. 2 prohibited agreements (EU Structural Fund project implementation services 
case (Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania, 2008) and EU Structural Fund project consultation services 
case (Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania, 2006) were initiated by the purchasing organizations 
(purchasers), personally concerned about relevant organizations’ winning the procurement. The main subjects, at 
whose initiative an investigation on the suspected infringement of competition was started, involved public authorities, 
supervising the organization of public procurement, and the subjects who organized tenders. Only in the case of the 
cartel Minor mechanization and other Gear for sale (Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania, 2010), the 
Competition Council was notified on the prohibited agreement by a cartel member.
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13 cartels were detected in the ‘B to B’ market, which mainly (9 cases) represented the service sector. The 
average lifetime of cartels in this group is 4.6 years (the minimum duration is 1 year, the longest operation of a 
cartel - 13 years), the average number of cartel members - 9. The main condition that determined the emergence of
the majority of cartels in this group involves the operation of subjects representing business interests in the market.
Fig. 2. Prohibited agreements in the public procurement tenders and the number of undertakings involved 
Business associations had a dual effect on the formation of cartels: indirect – creating conditions for the members
to exchange information and thus breaching the Law on Competition (e.g. milk processing companies, via the
association ‘Dairy Center’, shared information about the milk purchase and product sales prices) and direct - by 
personal involvement in concluding prohibited agreements or otherwise breaching the Law on Competition. This is 
supported by statistics – in Lithuania, during the analyzed period, 6 associations were punished for their 
involvement in prohibited agreements: Lithuanian Chamber of Auditors, Lithuanian Communication Agencies
Association, Packaging and Electronic Waste Management Association, Lithuanian Cynological Society, Lithuanian
Shipbrokers and Agents Association, Lithuanian Brewers Guild. In the period of 2000 - 2014, the breakdown of the 
majority of cartels in the ‘B to B’ market (10 cases, 77 %) occurred due to investigations on potential cartels started 
by the Lithuanian Competition Council. The breakdown of 3 cartels in this group was caused by non-cartel 
companies which notified the Competition Council on the possible infringements of competition, 1 cartel - by the 
buyer and supplier’s joint complaint submitted to the Competition Council. This suggests that both the consumers 
and suppliers or non-cartel companies are taking insufficient actions to expose cartel agreements.
Fig. 3. Duration and number of members of prohibited agreements in the ‘B to B‘ market
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During the analyzed period 10 cartels were detected in the ‘B to C’ market. In ‘Non-life Insurance’ market, the 
cartel operated in both (B to C and B to B) markets. The average duration of cartels in these groups was 3 years, the 
average number of members - 10. The main condition for the emergence of cartels is cartel companies’ own desire 
to conclude a prohibited agreement. It should also be noted that associations influence the emergence of cartels in 
this group as well. 4 cartel members were members of associations: Orthopedic and Rehabilitation Services 
Providers Association, Driver Training Services in Klaipeda, Taxi Services in Vilnius and Beer Production and 
Trade. The breakdown of cartels occurred not only due to the Competition Council’s actions, but, contrary to the 
case in the second group of cartels, due to other subjects - 2 cartels were reported by the buyers and 3 cartels – by 
non-cartel companies. This suggests that cartels in the 'B to C’ market are less organized, more noticeable and faster 
detected than the cartels in the ‘B to B’ market.
Fig. 4. Duration and number of members of prohibited agreements in the ‘B to C‘ market
The summarized information on the subjects affected cartel activities in Lithuania is presented in Table 1. The 
subjects that had frequent influence on cartels are marked with XXX (strong impact); the subjects had influenced for 
several cartels - XX (average influence); the subjects characteristic for 1-2 cartels are marked with X (low impact).
Table. 1. Economic subjects affecting the emergence and breakdown of cartels
Effect on cartels Associations Cartel 
companies
Non-cartel 
companies
Subjects of 
public sector
Purchasers
(clients)
Competition 
Council
Suppliers
Affecting the emergence XXX XXX X X
Affecting the breakdown X XX XXX XX XXX X
The conducted analysis leads to the conclusion that the success of ‘Lithuanian’ cartel activity was not affected by 
the following subjects included in the theoretical evaluation model (see Fig. 1): the producers of substitutes and
potential competitors. The formation of cartels was strongly affected by business associations, and of course, the 
cartel’s own companies, seeking to conclude a prohibited agreement. The main subject preventing cartel activity is
the Competition Council (34 % of cartel investigations were started at its initiative). Other subjects that informed 
about the prohibited agreement were non-cartel companies, buyers and cartel companies. The subjects of the public 
sector, such as ministries, support funds and public institutions, were among the main subjects who reported about 
the possible cartel agreements in the public procurement sphere.
Conclusions
The use of integrated approach in the analysis of cartel problematic led to apply the traditional models of 
competitiveness, which helped to analyze the problematic widely and to identify the main economic subjects, making 
influence on the emergence and breakdown of the cartel. The knowledge and the recognition of these main economic 
2
16
6
10 11
4
12
29
2
7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Fuel market Photography
service market
Non-life
insurance
market
Driver training
services in
Klaipeda
Taxi services in
Vilnius
Decoupage,
craft supplies
and other
related
products
market
Production of
Orthopedic
technical
preparations
Organized
travel sales and
other related
activities
Food
production and
sale
Beer
production and
trade
un
de
rt
al
ki
ng
s
du
ra
ti
on
cases duration
Undertakings
72   Irena Pekarskiene and Jurgita Bruneckiene /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  213 ( 2015 )  67 – 73 
subjects will help for the competition authorities, scientists, politicians and society to fight against cartel in the market. The 
results of the theoretical and practical analysis could be used widely to inform the society and can be treated as the 
prevention mean against new cartel formation in the market. The modified Porter's ‘Five Forces‘ model was used as a 
methodological base for the analysis in Lithuania. The empirical analysis proved that:
- The emergence of cartels in the public procurement sphere was mostly determined by the companies’ involved in the 
procurement tender incentive to agree with each other. The subjects that determined the breakdown of cartels involved 
public authorities supervising the organization of procurement and the subjects who organized the tenders.
- The emergence of cartels in the ‘B to B’ market was mostly determined by the subjects’ representing business 
interests in the market. The breakdown of cartels mostly was caused by the competition authorities’ activities.
- The emergence of cartels in the ‘B to C’ market was mostly determined by the cartel companies’ own incentive to 
conclude a prohibited agreement and the subjects’ representing business interests in the market. The strongest effect on the 
cartels breakdown was made by the competition authorities’ activities, buyers, non-cartel companies. Cartels in the ‘B to
C’ market are more noticeable and faster detected than the cartels in the 'B to B’ market.
- Substitutes producers, potential competitors do not affect the emergence and breakdown of cartels in Lithuania;
- Cheating and reporting on the cartel member, frequently emphasized in the scientific literature and attributed to the 
most important factors of internal destabilization of a cartel, is not characteristic for Lithuanian cartels.
- In Lithuania, both the consumers and suppliers or non-cartel companies are passive and take insufficient actions to 
notify on cartels and contribute to their breakdown.
The introduction of a system of rewards to individuals for the provision of information about the cartel in Lithuania, the 
application of the pattern for imposing fines on associations established in Articles 23(2) to (4) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003, the encouraging of implementation of the competition law compliance programme in undertakings, the 
obligation of the state and municipal institutions, agencies or organisations to appeal to courts of general competence for 
follow-on actions if the Competition Council adopts a resolution stating that entities involved in public procurement 
procedures have formed a cartel and the ensurance of the independence of the Lithuanian Competition Council and the 
consolidation of its institutional capacity will directly encourage the fight with the cartels emergence and activities in the
market. 
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